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I.  DIAGNOSIS 
The main task of international courts usually lies with applying the 
law to questions and facts in accordance with the standards of the legal 
profession. The view persists that interpretation, a necessary part of this 
task, is about uncovering the law that is already out there, contained and 
conserved in given norms. International courts and the outward show of 
legal argument nourish this view. In prototypical fashion, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) stressed that “the Court, as a court of 
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law, cannot render judgment sub specie legis ferendae, or anticipate the 
law before the legislator has laid it down.”1 In its Nuclear Weapons 
advisory opinion, the ICJ reiterated that it “cannot legislate, and, in the 
circumstances of the present case, it is not called upon to do so. Rather, 
its task is to engage in its normal judicial function of ascertaining the 
existence of legal principles and rules applicable to the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons.”2 Further examples abound, also from other 
international judicial institutions.3 Even if the metaphorical report of 
judges as the bouche de la loi no longer directs—if it ever did—the 
thought on what judges actually do, the understanding is still ubiquitous 
that judges find and give voice to the applicable law in individual cases 
by examining the relevant norms in the context of the legal system. 
Interpretation looks like an act of discovering meanings and of 
uncovering the law, very much like an exercise in archaeology. At the 
same time, it is not at all uncommon to see that international courts not 
only interpret the law in this sense but also develop the law in their 
practice. As a matter of fact, for many key protagonists, like Sir Hersch 
Lauterpacht, developing the law was actually the ICJ’s “essential 
function.”4 During the First World War, Hans Wehberg, another 
influential voice in international legal scholarship at the time, also 
emphatically pled that international law be developed by way of more 
international adjudicatory practice.5 
Upon closer inspection, however, the concept of development 
starts to blur.6 It seems to suggest the creation of something new, or at 
 
 1. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 53 (July 25). 
 2. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 
¶ 18 (July 8). 
 3. See, e.g., Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the 
United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 4, at 8 (Mar. 3); Appellate Body Report, Japan – 
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, at 11, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WTDS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 
1996) [hereinafter Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body Report]. 
 4. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT 42 (1958) [hereinafter LAUTERPACHT, DEVELOPMENT] (arguing that it is 
the court’s “essential function . . . to contribute by its decisions to the development of 
international law”). Cf. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 249 (1933). 
 5. HANS WEHBERG, THE PROBLEM OF AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 11, 55 
(1918) (explicitly exclaiming that the solution is “[a] further development of international law 
through international decisions!”). 
 6. See Georges Abi-Saab, De la jurisprudence:  Quelques réflexions sur son rôle dans le 
développement du droit international, in HACIA UN NUEVO ORDEN INTERNACIONAL Y EUROPEO 
19, 25 (1993) (suggesting that the role of case law in the development of public international law 
is the archetypical case of a claire-obscure subject). 
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the very least, an addition to that which already exists.7 But in this sense 
the concept of development would challenge the idea that international 
courts apply and do not make law. As such, it stands almost as an 
antithesis to “proper” adjudication. Couched within the prevailing idea 
about the main international judicial task, the concept of development 
has overall lost its contours. Notably, Lauterpacht and Wehberg use 
development interchangeably with clarification. In their arguments, 
development means making law visible.8 This legacy resonates in more 
recent writings just as well. Christopher Greenwood, for example, 
writes about the development of international criminal law by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in 
contradistinction to the making of new law, which is not part of the task 
and function of the tribunal.9 On this account, in both their roles as 
interpreters and developers of the law, international courts give voice to 
the existing law—or, in Lauterpacht’s parlance, to the law that lies 
behind the cases.10 
Views on interpretation as discovery and development as 
clarification have certainly not been without critique. These views do 
not stand up to theoretical scrutiny and, to be sure, they are usually not 
taken at face value. However, they are influential nonetheless. Legal 
reasoning compels all actors to base their arguments on the law as it is; 
everything else would defeat their claims from the outset. As Stanley 
Fish puts it, “the very point of the legal enterprise requires that its 
practitioners see continuity where others, with less of a stake in the 
enterprise, might feel free to see change.”11 For international courts, it is 
all the more important to portray their practice as firmly based on the 
law as it stands because this is an important source of their legitimacy. 
Whenever the impression gains currency that they are not engaged in 
the proper business of applying the law given to them, they are usually 
in trouble. 
 
 7. See Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, Beyond Dispute:  International Institutions as 
Lawmakers, 12 GERMAN L.J. 979 (2011) (explaining that the concept of judicial lawmaking 
would emphasize precisely this creative dimension of international adjudication). 
 8. See LAUTERPACHT, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4, at 42–43; see also WEHBERG, supra 
note 5, at 11–12. 
 9. Christopher Greenwood, The Development of International Law by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 2 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 97, 111 (1998). 
 10. See LAUTERPACHT, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4, at 3–74 (discussing “The Law Behind 
the Cases”). 
 11. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY:  CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE 
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERATURE AND LEGAL STUDIES 157 (1989). 
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The problem is that the outward show of legal reasoning— 
depicting interpretation as discovery and development as clarification—
overburdens the language of law with aspirations it cannot meet. More 
precisely, this reasoning suggests that legal rules contain within 
themselves the yardsticks that separate correct from incorrect 
applications of the law.12 Typically, interpretations should not fill the 
law with that which it does not already contain, but should uncover 
what is already there.13 The text should separate permissible from 
impermissible interpretations.14 The myth that sustains this view is the 
idea that legal provisions come with meanings attached to them. If one 
had access to the underlying meaning, then the law could be found, 
correct applications could be distinguished from incorrect readings, and 
development could be distinguished from a mere statement of what the 
law really is. Alas, this premise crumbles under a little closer reflection 
and with a little distance from the legal enterprise. 
The present article unfolds the central proposition of the linguistic 
turn and contends that law only exists in its interpretative practice and is 
not something ready to be discovered. The content of the law is shaped 
in the creative acts of interpretation—its jurisgenerative practice.15 This 
move first of all redirects attention toward the actors of interpretation. 
Notably then, the argument continues that international courts generally 
enjoy outstanding semantic authority. Their decisions weigh heavily in 
disputes about what the law really means. At the same time, it is rather 
evident that this authority in interpretation is not boundless, but 
constrained. But how can the practice of international adjudication be 
understood as both creative and constrained under the premise that law 
does not have a meaning other than that contributed to it in its use? 
With greater emphasis on what is at stake from a normative angle, the 
question is who rules, the law or the courts? Working out these 
questions will be the crux of the present article addressing the role of 
international courts as interpreters and developers of the law. 
This article will illustrate the persistently influential view 
regarding the role of international courts that belittles their qualities as 
 
 12. J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 774 (1987). 
 13. See infra Part II.C. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See generally INGO VENZKE, HOW INTERPRETATION MAKES INTERNATIONAL LAW:  
ON SEMANTIC CHANGE AND NORMATIVE TWISTS (2012, forthcoming) [hereinafter VENZKE, 
HOW INTERPRETATION MAKES INTERNATIONAL LAW] (leaning on developments in linguistics 
and developing a theoretical account of interpretation as a practice that is both creative and 
constrained). 
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actors in the making of international law. It summarizes why the 
outward show of judicial argument eclipses this dimension of judicial 
practice and then speaks on the metaphor of sources, and how it has 
(mis)shaped accounts of international lawmaking (Part II). The third 
part then takes a step back and asserts the proposition that it is 
impossible to find meaning anywhere else other than in the concrete use 
of legal provisions. It highlights how law comes to life in the practice of 
interpretation and argues that this practice itself has to bear the burden 
of distinguishing correct from incorrect applications of the law (Part 
III). The next step first elucidates international courts’ semantic 
authority by focusing on the mighty spell of judicial precedents in 
international legal discourse and then turns to sketching the principal 
normative implications (Part IV). Finally, the concluding prognosis 
recommends paying closer regard to the qualities of international courts 
as actors in the jurisgenerative practice of interpretation. It ends with the 
suggestion to develop a better understanding of the role of international 
courts in a normative pluriverse in which they interact with actors on 
other levels of governance and negotiate spheres of authority (Part V). 
II.  MYTHS IN THE FIELD OF ADJUDICATION 
A.  The Field of Adjudication 
International courts portray their practice as applying the law that 
is given to them.16 In one of its very early Advisory Opinions the ICJ 
exemplarily stated “it is a duty of the Court to interpret treaties, not to 
revise them.”17 Other institutions have recurrently made similar 
pronouncements in their case law. Court statutes also frequently testify 
that applying the law, rather than revising it, is precisely what they are 
supposed to do. The renowned Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
explicitly provides that the dispute settlement system serves “to clarify 
the existing provisions of [the covered] agreements in accordance with 
 
 16. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Le juge et la règle générale, 93 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 569, 569 (1989); Maurice Kamto, La volonté de l’état en droit 
international, 310 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 284 (2004); see generally LAURENCE BAUM, JUDGES 
AND THEIR AUDIENCES (2006) (showing how courts cater to the expectations of their audience). 
 17. Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), Judgment 
1952 I.C.J. 176, 196, 200, 206 (Aug. 27). See also Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Romania, Second Phase, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 221, 229 (July 18). 
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customary rules of interpretation of public international law.”18 It further 
stresses that the recommendations and rulings of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) “cannot add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements.”19 While it is reassuring 
with regard to the nature of the main judicial task, this provision also 
reflects an apprehension that reality frequently does not live up to the 
tidiness of orthodox doctrine.20  
The WTO Appellate Body (AB) has relied on Article 3.2 of the 
DSU to corroborate the view that its reports do little more than give 
voice to the law.21 Ever since its very first decision, US – Gasoline, the 
court embraced the customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law for its task, seeking the most solid ground for 
ascertaining the law.22 In particular, in its early years, the AB sought to 
augment its authority with uncertain success to the extent that its 
practice has sharply been termed to portray a “textual fetish.”23 For 
example, in the hard-fought and crucial report of the US – Shrimp case, 
the AB criticized the panel for not having followed the international law 
rules of interpretation and underscored that “[a] treaty interpreter must 
begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be 
interpreted.”24 
While the hermeneutics of international courts differ, other bodies, 
also renowned for their dynamism, are just as eager to sustain the view 
of their practice as impeccable applications of the law. If there are 
 
 18. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, Annex 2, Art. 3.2, 33. I.L.M. 1125 (1994). 
See also Jan Klabbers, On Rationalism in Politics:  Interpretation of Treaties and the World 
Trade Organization, 74 NORDIC J. INT’L LAW 405, 408 (2005). 
 19. Id. at 412. 
 20. Id. at 412–13. 
 21. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, at 17, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Gasoline Appellate 
Body Report]; Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 10. 
 22. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 21, at 17; Alcoholic Beverages Appellate 
Body Report, supra note 3, at 10. 
 23. See Douglas A. Irwin & Joseph H.H. Weiler, Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (DS 285), 7 WORLD TRADE REV. 71, 89–95 (2008). Cf. 
Georges Abi-Saab, The Appellate Body and Treaty Interpretation, in THE WTO AT TEN:  THE 
CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 453, 461 (Giorgio Sacerdoti, Alan 
Yanovich & Jan Bohanes eds., 2006) (suggesting with less of an edge that the emphasis on the 
text in interpretation might be too much). See generally ISABELLE VAN DAMME, TREATY 
INTERPRETATION BY THE WTO APPELLATE BODY 106 (2009) (discussing the patterns in the 
Appellate Body’s interpretative practice more generally). 
 24. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, ¶ 114, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). 
  
2011] Role of International Courts 105 
changes in the law without anything that could sensibly be termed 
legislation, they have come about outside the practice of the court. 
Courts only make what has already happened visible. The European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), for instance, is known for its method 
of evolutive interpretation and its characterization of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (Convention) as a living instrument.25 
With this notion, the ECtHR recognizes that the law changes through 
societal processes even where the Convention it applies has not been 
amended to reflect those processes. However, in the same breath with 
which the ECtHR pronounces a dynamic interpretation, it usually voices 
limits to this method by habitually reiterating that it cannot create new 
law or add rights to the Convention that it does not already contain.26 
International courts have an interest in sustaining the view that 
they simply apply existing law because the view nourishes the main 
source of their authority. They purport to respect the parties’ consent to 
international adjudication and deny any agency.27 Legal reasoning is 
critical to this effect. Hersch Lauterpacht and Hans Wehberg saw the 
development and clarification of the law as the most important 
international judicial function, precisely because only if the law were 
sufficiently clear and predictable would states submit to international 
adjudication.28 International courts would unleash the potential of the 
pacifying language of the law, which builds exactly on its distance from 
the muddy business of politics and diplomacy.29 Elihu Root, one of 
President Theodore Roosevelt’s Secretaries of State and a key figure at 
the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907, expressed this unrelenting 
 
 25. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, Eur. Ct. H.R. A 26 ¶ 31 (1978). Among 
the more recent cases in this regard, see Bayatyan v. Armenia, App. No. 23459/03, ¶ 63 (Oct. 27, 
2009); Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2), 2009-17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 104; Emonet and others v. Switzerland, 
49 Eur. Ct. H.R. 11, ¶¶ 66, 83 (2007). Cf. Rudolf Bernhardt, Evolutive Treaty Interpretation of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, 42 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 11 (1999). 
 26. E.g., Johnston v. Ireland, App. No. 9697/82, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)  ¶ 53 (Dec. 18, 
1986) (“[T]he Court cannot, by means of an evolutive interpretation, derive from these 
instruments a right that was not included therein at the outset. This is particularly so here, where 
the omission was deliberate.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools) (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 
P.C.I.J (ser. A) No. 15, at 22 (Apr. 26); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.) 1948 I.C.J. 15, at 27 (Mar. 
25); Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), 1984 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 34 (Mar. 21); East Timor 
(Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, at 101 (June 30); see also Cesare P.R. Romano, The Shift from 
Consensual to Compulsory Paradigm in International Adjudication:  Elements for a Theory of 
Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 791, 816–29 (2007) (suggesting a paradigm shift from 
consensual to compulsory jurisdiction, with notable exceptions for the ICJ and IACHR). 
 28. LAUTERPACHT, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4, at 42. 
 29. See WEHBERG, supra note 5, at 55. 
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advocacy for a strong international judiciary when he eloquently and 
emphatically argued:  “What we need for the future development of 
arbitration is the substitution of judicial action for diplomatic action, the 
substitution of judicial sense of responsibility for diplomatic sense of 
responsibility.”30 
Whenever it is more than sporadically disputed that courts do 
something other than apply the law given to them, the courts are usually 
in trouble. Their response to finding themselves in this kind of trouble is 
to try even harder to portray their practice as impeccable rule-
following.31 Psychologist Dan Simon persuasively argues that no matter 
how plagued with doubt and uncertainty the process of coming to a 
decision may have been, judges would still present the outcome as the 
only possible solution and all alternatives as next to absurd.32 It is 
precisely this legitimacy angst that leads to rather apodictic reasoning, 
even though this may not be the best long-term strategy. However, not 
only outside pressure and outside expectations hold international judges 
to the outward show of legal argument; their ethos and genuine 
conviction may also push them towards embracing their activity as one 
of finding the law to be applied to the facts in front of them.33  
Moreover, the juridical language itself contributes to the image of 
impersonality and objectivity. Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has remarked 
that the law’s language contains both a neutralization and 
universalization effect.34 He claims that this is “[f]ar from being a 
simple ideological mask,” but rather, “the basis of a real autonomy of 
thought and practice, the expression of the whole operation of the 
juridical field.”35 It is an attitude much more than a mask for domination 
or for the cunning exercise of power, he suggests.36 The ICJ expresses 
this thought clearly when it maintains that “[l]aw exists . . . to serve a 
 
 30. Id. (quoting Elihu Root). 
 31. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM:  LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 12–13 (1964). 
See also BAUM, supra note 16, at 25–49 (discussing how judges manage their own appearance in 
view of considerations of social legitimacy). 
 32. Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 
19–22 (1998). Cf. Hersch Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of 
Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRITISH Y.B. INT’L L. 48, 53 (1949) (“[I]t is 
elegant—and it inspires confidence—to give the garb of an established rule of interpretation to a 
conclusion reached as to the meaning . . . of a treaty.”).  
 33. SHKLAR, supra note 31, at 12. 
 34. Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law:  Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 
HASTINGS L.J. 814, 820 (1987). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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social need; . . . precisely for that reason it can do so only through and 
within the limits of its own discipline. Otherwise, it is not a legal service 
that would be rendered.”37 Drawing on the Weberian study of the 
legitimating effect of rationalization, Bourdieu finally contends that  
[t]he ritual that is designed to intensify the authority of the act of 
interpretation . . . adds to the collective work of sublimation designed 
to attest that the decision expresses not the will or the world-view of 
the judge but the will of the law or the legislature (voluntas legis or 
legislatoris).38 
In short, the outward show of legal argument is part and parcel of 
the social legitimacy in the field of adjudication. It also generally 
responds to expectations of other participants in legal discourse and has 
the aptitude to constrain and allow for critique. Argumentative 
standards in legal discourse harbor a potential to contribute to the 
normative legitimation of international adjudication.39 There is thus little 
purchase in suggesting that judges are liars when they portray their 
practice as one of finding the law that is given to them.40 It is 
problematic, however, if the outward show of legal practice directs our 
thinking on what really happens. 
B.  The Metaphor of Sources 
Two ideas are complicit in misdirecting our thought on the role of 
international courts in interpreting and developing the law:  thinking of 
lawmaking in terms of sources, and thinking of interpretation as 
uncovering what is already out there. Both these ideas are myths, not in 
the strong sense of the word that sometimes carries a subtle and 
possibly stingy accusation of naïveté, but in the sense of assumptions 
that are so deeply embedded in prevailing narratives of what happens 
 
 37. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 49 (July 18). The 
case is a textbook example of how such a retreat to a narrow, if not poor, version of legal 
positivism masks very clear and palpable political choices. See Edward McWhinney, Judicial 
Settlement of Disputes:  Jurisdiction and Justiciability, 221 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 36–46 (1990). 
 38. Bourdieu, supra note 34, at 828. 
 39. See infra Part IV.A. In closer detail, see Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, On the 
Democratic Legitimation of International Judicial Lawmaking, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1341, 1344 
(2011) [hereinafter Bogdandy & Venzke, Democratic Legitimation]. 
 40. See generally Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 155 (1994). 
At best it may point to precisely this paradox. See Ralph Christensen, Die Paradoxie richterlicher 
Gesetzesbindung, in RECHT VERHANDELN. ARGUMENTIEREN, BEGRÜNDEN UND ENTSCHEIDEN 
IM DISKURS DES RECHTS 1, 4–7 (Kent D. Lerch ed., 2005). 
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that they are not questioned.41 Making those assumptions evident and 
subject to critique is the purpose of this section. 
The idea that international courts can confine themselves to 
applying the law hinges on the notion that the law is made by someone 
else. In international law, the argument goes, the law is made in ways 
that are recognized by the doctrine of sources. Thinking of international 
lawmaking in terms of sources can be traced back to the heyday of 
classic liberalism in international law when domestic contractual 
theories were projected onto the international level.42 As a bottom line, 
legitimacy rests on consent and each of the individual sources listed in 
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute pretends to be a manifestation of such 
consent by the states.43  
A quick run-through of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute shows that 
treaty law most straightforwardly credits state consent.44 The source of 
international custom gives rise to more protracted difficulties, but the 
understanding here also prevails that the formation of customary 
international law holds state practice and opinio juris to be decisive 
precisely because they are manifestations of state consent.45 A look at 
 
 41. On such an understanding of myths and their production in societal processes, see 
generally ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES (1972). 
 42. See Gerry Simpson, Imagined Consent:  Democratic Liberalism in International Legal 
Theory, 15 AUSTL. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 103, 103 (1994); JULIUS GOEBEL, THE EQUALITY OF 
STATES:  A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF LAW 34 (1925). Cf. Paul Guggenheim, Contribution à 
l’histoire des sources du droit des gens, 4 RECUEIL DES COURS 5, 20–35 (1958) (arguing that the 
need for a sophisticated positive doctrine of sources increased while natural law thinking receded 
into the background). 
 43. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993. See also GODEFRIDUS J.J. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 76–82 (1983). 
 44. See Karin Oellers-Frahm, The Evolving Role of Treaties in International Law, in 
PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 173, 176–79 (Russell A. Miller & Rebecca Bratspies eds., 
2008); see also ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 16–32, 94–121 (2d ed. 
2007). This proposition holds even if there are by now many odd cases and noteworthy 
tendencies to curtail the consent requirement in amendment procedures. For instance, see JAN 
KLABBERS, THE CONCEPT OF TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15–36 (1996); DEVELOPMENTS 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker Röben eds., 2005); 
Malagosia A. Fitzmaurice, Modifications to the Principle of Consent in Relation to Certain 
Treaty Obligations, 2 AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 275, 280–82 (1997) (detailing the aspects 
of consent within environmental treaty regimes). 
 45. Tullio Treves, Customary International Law, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed. 2006); Alain Pellet, Article 38, in STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE:  A COMMENTARY 677, 749–59 (Andreas Zimmermann, 
Christian Tomuschat & Karin Oellers-Frahm eds., 2006) (explaining in detail the definition of 
custom in international law); Peter Haggenmacher, La doctrine des deux élements du droit 
coutumier dans la practique de la cour internationale, 90 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 5, 6–7 (1986). On the quaint understanding of customary law as a form 
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the use of general principles, however, may turn out to be most 
dizzying.46 Oftentimes, general principles are closely intertwined with 
such notions as equity that are usually not themselves taken as sources 
of the law, but as guiding yardsticks on the level of interpretation, or as 
rescue kits when gaps in the law need to be filled.47 Jurisprudence has 
been both unproductive and ambiguous in this regard.48 The ICJ once 
famously spoke of “general and well-recognized principles [such as] 
elementary considerations of humanity.”49 But on a later occasion the 
ICJ reasserted its decidedly legalistic ethos arguing that 
[i]t is a court of law, and can take account of moral principles only in 
so far as these are given a sufficient expression in legal form . . . . 
Humanitarian considerations may constitute the inspirational basis 
for rules of law . . . . Such considerations do not, however, in 
themselves amount to rules of law.50 
There is abundant treatment of the details of each source, its 
elements, and its problems.51 It is also true that there is considerable flux 
and significant developments in the understanding of sources.52 The 
 
of tacit agreement, see Maurice Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272 
RECUEIL DES COURS 155, 264 (1998). 
 46. Martti Koskenniemi, General Principles:  Reflexions on Constructivist Thinking in 
International Law, 18 Oikeustiede-Jurisprudentia [Yearbook of the Finnish Law Society] 120, 
125 (1985). Cf. Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law:  Custom, Jus 
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 99–100 (1988) (arguing that more 
lenient approaches to the formation of customary law are better treated in terms of general 
principles). 
 47. ULRICH FASTENRATH, LÜCKEN IM VÖLKERRECHT:  ZU RECHTSCHARAKTER, QUELLEN, 
SYSTEMZUSAMMENHANG, METHODENLEHRE UND FUNKTIONEN DES VOLKERRECHTS 127–34 
(1991); Michael Akehurst, Equity and General Principles of Law, 25 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 801, 
801 (1976).  
 48. The field of international criminal law might count as an exception. See Fabián O. 
Raimondo, General Princ iples of Law, Judicial Creativity and the Development of International 
Criminal Law, in JUDICIAL CREATIVITY AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 45, 46 
(Shane Darcy & Joseph Powderly eds., 2010). 
 49. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9). Cf. Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), (Judgment) 1986, I.C.J. 14, 
¶ 218 (June 27) (speaking of “fundamental principles of humanitarian law” and referring to its 
dictum in Corfu Channel). See also Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 
¶ 183 (Dec. 10, 1998). 
 50. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, Judgment, 1966, 
I.C.J. 6, ¶ 49 (July 18). 
 51. See, e.g., Abi-Saab, supra note 6, at 19, 25–26; Pellet, supra note 45, at 749–59; VAN 
HOOF, supra note 43, at 76–81; MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA:  THE 
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 360–65 (2005). 
 52. See Abi-Saab, supra note 6, at 19, 25–26; Pellet, supra note 45, at 749–59, 783–84; VAN 
HOOF, supra note 43, at 76–81; KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 51, at 360–65. 
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main contention here is that the concept of source will continue to 
sustain the idea that acts and instruments that come under its heading 
fill out all the space where the law is made. In this vein, Article 38(1)(d) 
of the ICJ Statute speaks of “judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists” as “subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.”53 It thus gives them a standing similar to 
factors influencing the meaning of a legal norm. Judicial decisions are 
not themselves considered sources, but means for identifying legal 
norms—a source for recognizing the law (Rechtserkenntnisquelle) but 
not a source of law (Rechtsquelle).54 It may well be suggested that this 
distinction should be played down.55 In particular, the mighty spell of 
precedents in legal discourse indicates that it is at least partially out of 
sync with legal practice, which is the ultimate arbiter about what counts 
as a source of law and what does not.56 
The main issue to address here lies in the very concept of source 
and its impact on our imagination. Sources picture lawmaking as a one-
time act—ideally captured in the journalist’s snapshot of state 
representatives signing an international treaty in festive environments.57 
Legal doctrine seems to have been caught in this image very much in 
the way Ludwig Wittgenstein described:  “A picture held us captive. 
And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language 
seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.”58 Similarly, the metaphor of 
sources has helped to sustain an understanding of lawmaking that is 
held prisoner in its confines, systematically pointing to a narrow 
segment of reality while eclipsing the rest.59 This metaphor suggests that 
legal norms spring from dark and hidden places into daylight and it 
overshadows incremental lawmaking in processes of interpretation 
where actors argue about what the law really means. 
 
 53. United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, Apr. 18, 1946. 
 54. Pellet, supra note 45, at 783–84. 
 55. Abi-Saab, supra note 6, at 26. 
 56. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100–10, 120–28, 130 (1997). See also infra Part 
IV.A on the spell of precedents. 
 57. See the photograph of Anwar al-Sadat, Jimmy Carter and Menachem Begin at the 
signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979 that adorns the cover of AUST, supra note 44. 
 58. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS ¶ 115 (1958). 
 59. On metaphor and perception, see Philipp Sarasin, Diskurstheorie und 
Geschichtswissenschaft, in HANDBUCH SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHE DISKURSANALYSE 53, 68–
69 (Reiner Keller et al. eds., 2006); Marga Reiner & Elisabeth Camp, Metaphor, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 845, 845 (Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith eds., 
2006). 
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C.  The Semantics of Interpretation 
The second myth partially responsible for misdirecting our 
thinking about the practice of international courts is that interpretation 
uncovers the law already out there, hidden in or behind the rules to be 
applied.60 There is a difficulty here that stems from the fact that views 
on interpretation tend very much to be shaped by asking how 
interpreters should interpret and by amassing accounts of what 
interpreters themselves say about their acts of interpretation. The rules 
of interpretation then say what interpretation is. With regard to treaties, 
these rules are spelled out in Article 31 in paragraph 1 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), providing that “[a] treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose.”61 The nuanced debates by the 
International Law Commission (ILC) on this article remain 
tremendously intriguing regarding the differing views on the definition 
of interpretation.62 
According to Sir Humphrey Waldock, one of the ILC’s special 
rapporteurs on this topic, any interpreter should quite naturally first look 
at a treaty’s wording.63 The text of a treaty “must be presumed to be the 
authentic expression of the intentions of the parties.”64 An interpreter 
should turn to the text as a proxy for finding that to which the parties 
have consented. In its early years, the ICJ has held that “the first duty of 
a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply provisions of a 
treaty, is to endeavor to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary 
meaning in the context in which they occur.”65 The ICJ has on occasion 
reasserted that “[i]nterpretation must be based above all upon the text of 
 
 60. Cf.  Andrea Bianchi, Textual Interpretation and (International) Law Reading:  The Myth 
of (In)Determinacy and the Genealogy of Meaning, in MAKING TRANSNATIONAL LAW WORK IN 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 34, 48–49 (Pieter H.F. Bekker et al. eds., 2010).  
 61. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 62. See Bianchi, supra note 60, at 36; see generally VENZKE, HOW INTERPRETATION 
MAKES INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 15 (reading the debates at the ILC trough the lens of a 
quest for certainty). 
 63. Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties, Third Report on the Law of Treaties, at 56, 
Int’l L. Comm’n, U.N. DOC. A/CN.4/167 (July 7, 1964) (by Sir Humphrey Waldock). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United 
Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 4, at 8 (Mar. 3). 
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the treaty.”66 The AB also found that Article 31 of the VCLT “provides 
that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive 
process.”67 The words should provide stable ground for international 
adjudication. Legal doctrine and scholarship continue to uphold the 
assumption that the text itself could distinguish permissible from 
impermissible interpretations, firmly assigning interpretation its place 
within the confines of what is permissible by the text of the norm.68  
But what happens when the meaning of the text is contested? The 
work of international courts usually sets in precisely when disputing 
parties make diverging claims about what the law means.69 On a 
preliminary note, it may help to clarify that sometimes a case may of 
course, above all, revolve around questions of fact. The decisive issue 
may thus be finding out what really happened.70 This may then involve 
little disagreement about law. But, as soon as the question is raised as to 
whether certain facts can really come within the ambit of a provision—
whether, for example, something really amounted to an armed attack 
under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter—then this question 
becomes one of competing claims about what such a provision really 
means. The wording itself can then in all probability not provide a 
convincing answer to the dispute. It provides the battleground for 
semantic struggles but it does not provide the answer for their 
resolution.71  
The task of interpretation would then be to carve out the real 
meaning of the text—its true sense, as it were. Article 31 of the VCLT 
thus continues that the ordinary meaning should be given to the terms of 
 
 66. Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 41 (Apr. 
3); Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 
1995 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 33 (Feb. 15). 
 67. Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 11. The Appellate Body 
continued to cite the ICJ with the proposition that “interpretation must be based above all upon the 
text of the treaty.” Territorial Dispute, 1994 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 41. 
 68. See, in an exemplary fashion, RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 87 
(2008). In closer detail, see ROBERT KOLB, INTERPRÉTATION ET CRÉATION DU DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL: ESQUISSE D’UNE HERMÉNEUTIQUE JURIDIQUE MODERNE POUR LE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 412–13 (2006) (setting out to develop a fresh look at doctrine by 
drawing on studies in hermeneutics and arguing that interpreters must not fill the text with 
anything that it does not already contain). 
 69. Bourdieu, supra note 34, at 818. 
 70. It is another question whether international courts are really well-equipped or even 
willing to whole-heartedly engage in this task. 
 71. Ralph Christensen & Michael Sokolowski, Recht als Einsatz im semantischen Kampf, in 
SEMANTISCHE KÄMPFE:  MACHT UND SPRACHE IN DEN WISSENSCHAFTEN 353, 353 (Ekkehard 
Felder ed., 2006). Cf. Bourdieu, supra note 34, at 818 (suggesting that “control of the legal text is 
the prize to be won in interpretative struggles”). 
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a treaty “in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”72 
Not the naked word itself, but its meaning in the totality of its context 
would then provide certainty about how a treaty needs to be 
interpreted.73 Interpretation would then be about finding real meaning in 
a holistic view of the words to be interpreted by looking at their 
proximity in the text and at what the words aspire to do.  
Some protagonists in the ILC pointed out that this method of 
finding out the real meaning of the text would ultimately be futile 
because it would actually introduce more uncertain elements into the 
process of interpretation. Rather than look at interpretation, these 
protagonists prefer to look to the force that makes the treaty—the will 
behind the text. Hersch Lauterpacht, for example, vehemently argued 
that looking at the text without determining the will of the parties would 
be as bad as engaging in a kind of Begriffsjurisprudenz of the worst 
kind.74 He continued to argue that something so mysterious as an 
ordinary meaning should most certainly not be decisive.75 Importance 
should rather be placed on the travaux préparatoires as a fundamental, 
possibly the most important, element in treaty interpretation. Isolating 
the text from the intentions of its drafters is simply not permitted in his 
view.76 On this account, interpretation would be about finding the will 
of the parties as a yardstick for determining what the law really means.77 
There are a number of evident problems with reaching through the 
text and analyzing the force behind it. On the fragile assumption that the 
drafting process was neatly documented and readily available, even in 
good faith, it is frequently impossible to find a uniform intention of the 
drafters.78 Anything found in the negotiating records would also be in 
need of interpretation and resorting to the force behind the treaty, with 
all the methodological challenges this would involve, might ultimately 
render the law to be rather outdated. 
It is neither necessary nor possible to resolve these difficulties 
here. Canvassing the different views on how to interpret in a 
 
 72. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 61, art. 31(1). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Hersch Lauterpacht, De l’interpretation des traités:  Rapport, 43 ANNUAIRE DE 
L’INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 366, 389, 397 (1950). 
 75. Id. at 380. 
 76. Id. at 389. Cf. Jan Klabbers, International Legal Histories:  The Declining Importance of 
Travaux Préparatoires in Treaty Interpretation?, 50 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 267, 277 (2003). 
 77. Klabbers, supra note 76, at 278. 
 78. Philip Allott, The Concept of International Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 31, 43 (1999). 
(drastically suggesting that “[a] treaty is a disagreement reduced to writing”). 
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rudimentary fashion rather serves the purpose of highlighting what 
interpretation is thought to be about:  finding a treaty’s meaning in 
whatever way it might be done best, by looking closely at the words 
themselves, their context, or the force behind them. Views on this 
matter differ among individuals and institutions, shaped by a number of 
factors including education, institutional culture, and general outlooks 
on the legitimatory basis or nature of international law.79 With regard to 
the last factor, it is interesting to see that over the past decades there 
may have been a subtle shift in understandings of interpretation that 
tends to detract from strong emphases on the will of parties.80 
Interpretative practice, in some fields like human rights protection and 
international criminal law in particular, increasingly invokes notions of 
fundamental values or community interests, possibly indicative of a 
deeper structural transformation of international society that influences 
understandings of interpretation.81 
Interpretation may then not only be about finding what the parties 
wanted, but also what interests the community, what is required by 
human rights, or what is morally the best answer.82 Any of these 
approaches tends to share the assumption—this merits emphasis—that 
interpreters find something that is already out there:  the parties’ will, 
the community’s interest, human rights’ imperatives, or morality’s best 
answer. In case of dispute about what the law means, international 
courts seek stable ground to portray their practice as based on 
something that already exists. Turning this understanding on its head, 
any of these targets of adjudication, and of legal interpretation more 
generally, are the products of its own practice. 
 
 79. See Jochen von Bernstorff & Ingo Venzke, Ethos, Ethics and Morality in International 
Relations, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (Rüdiger Wolfrum 
ed., 2010). 
 80. See, e.g., Klabbers, supra note 76, at 270–72 (detailing various methods for interpreting 
treaties). 
 81. Among the truly rich literature on such possible transformation, see Georges Abi-Saab, 
Whither the International Community?, 9 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 248, 255 (1998); Bruno Simma, 
From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, 250 RECUEIL DES COURS 221, 
233 (1994); ANDREAS L. PAULUS, DIE INTERNATIONALE GEMEINSCHAFT IM VÖLKERRECHT:  
EINE UNTERSUCHUNG ZUR ENTWICKLUNG DES VÖLKERRECHTS IM ZEITALTER DER 
GLOBALISIERUNG 97–115 (2001); Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Geology of International Law—
Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy, 64 ZAÖRV 547, 552 (2004). 
 82. Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 CRITICAL INQUIRY 179–200 (1982). 
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III.  THE JURISGENERATIVE PRACTICE OF ADJUDICATION 
The concept of sources suggests that a rule is set in place at one 
point in time and then applied at a later stage.83 The corollary 
understanding of interpretation suggests that it is concerned with 
uncovering the rule already set in place.84 Both these elements build on 
the assumption that words come with a meaning that lies outside their 
use. Semantic pragmatism, however, teaches that it is not possible to 
find meaning anywhere else other than in the concrete use of words.85 
Law is made in its communicative practice (Part III.A). What does this 
mean for the international judicial function? It does not mean that 
judicial interpretation is unbound or subject to the pure volition of the 
interpreter. Adjudication rather unfolds against the stabilizing 
background of an interpretative community. But how exactly is it 
possible that adjudicators are constrained by the law that they 
themselves make (Part III.B)? This is also a formidable challenge for 
the idea of the rule of law that international courts are supposed to 
promote. Who rules, the law or the courts? 
A.  Lawmaking in Communicative Practice 
Legal provisions cannot talk. Nor can human rights, the interests of 
the international community, or morality for that matter. These concepts 
are talked about and gain meaning through the practice of interpretation. 
In Ludwig Wittgenstein’s succinct formulation that would trigger the 
linguistic turn, words do not have a meaning other than that given to 
them by their use.86 Wittgenstein solemnly maintained that the best one 
can do is to observe and find rules that describe the use of a rule.87 The 
meaning of such rule, however, would again only be given by its use, so 
 
 83. Hugh Thirlway, Concepts, Principles, Rules and Analogies:  International and 
Municipal Legal Reasoning, 294 RECUEIL DES COURS 265, 320 (2002). 
 84. See Klabbers, supra note 76, at 270. 
 85. Wittgenstein, supra note 58, ¶ 43. 
 86. Id. Insightful and cunning on the notion of the linguistic turn, see Richard Rorty, 
Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the Reification of Language, in 2 ESSAYS ON HEIDEGGER AND 
OTHERS 1, 50 (Richard Rorty ed., 1991). 
 87. Wittgenstein, supra note 58, ¶ 46. 
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that one is caught in an infinite regress.88 Only practice can help. In his 
notes On Certainty, Wittgenstein writes pithily:  “You must look at the 
practice of language, then you will see it.”89 This idea holds true all the 
same for (international) law. 
The field of adjudication suggests that interpretation in law is a 
statement of fact in the sense that it declares what the law is. Carrying 
on Wittgenstein’s legacy, John Langshaw Austin showed persuasively 
that “there can hardly be any longer a possibility of not seeing that 
stating is performing an act.”90 To illustrate his argument, Austin coins 
the concept of performative speech, by which he refers to 
communicative utterances that change the world.91 The worn example is 
the utterance of the words “I do,” which in the right context may create 
the bond of marriage. In a sly move, Austin tries to come up with 
distinctions that separate such creative performative speech acts from 
simple constative acts like “this is an apple.”92 If an international court 
only engaged in constative acts of the kind “this is what the law is,” 
then it could withdraw from any charge of making the law in its 
practice. Austin suggests, however, that this is simply not possible.93 He 
ultimately comes to the conclusion that every attempt at distinguishing 
performative from constative acts fails because it is impossible to 
withhold from interpreting even simple objects like apples, let alone 
complex ideas like the law.94 Austin thus lets this distinction collapse, 
thereby adding on to the strand of thinking that follows from the 
linguistic turn and its proposition that communicative practice shapes 
meanings.95  
Judicial interpretations that present themselves as declaring what 
the law really is contribute to its creation. Austin, a colleague of H.L.A. 
Hart at Oxford, wrote that “[o]f all people, jurists should be best aware 
 
 88. SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE 24 (1982). 
Kant’s work already offers an early account of infinite regress that concerns the application of 
general norms to concrete facts. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 132–33, 171–
72, 177 (Norman Kemp Smith trans. 1929) (1781) (“If [general logic] sought to give general 
instructions how we are to subsume under these rules, that is, to distinguish whether something 
does or does not come under them, that could only be by means of another rule. This in turn, for 
the very reason that it is a rule, again demands guidance from judgment.”). 
 89. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY ¶ 501 (1969).  
 90. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS:  THE WILLIAM JAMES LECTURES 
DELIVERED AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY IN 1955, 4, 139 (2d ed. 1976). 
 91. Id. at 138–39. 
 92. Id. at 140–41. 
 93. Id. at 141. 
 94. Id. at 142–43; FISH, supra note 11, at 488–91. 
 95. See AUSTIN, supra note 90, at 138–39. 
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of the true sense of affairs . . . [y]et they succumb to their own timorous 
fiction, that a statement of ‘the law’ is a statement of fact.”96 Quite the 
contrary, a statement of the law forms part of lawmaking. This bears 
repeating:  it is impossible not to interpret the law, and only in its 
practice does law come to life.97 Practice itself has to bear the burden of 
completing the lawmaking process in concrete instances by interpreting 
the relevant facts and legal materials. The law is not fixed in and at its 
source; rather, it gains meaning and shape in its interpretation.  
Only occasionally does this thought still raise eyebrows. Hans 
Kelsen already formulated a similar argument almost a century ago 
when he forcefully critiqued orthodox judicial methodology for wanting 
to make believe that the act of interpretation is nothing but an act of 
understanding and clarification, whereas it really depends on a choice, 
an act of will.98 Kelsen maintained that acts of law-application are also 
acts of law-creation and argued that in the individually disputed case the 
law cannot be discovered but only created.99 His critique of 
methodological orthodoxy led him in his late writings so far as to 
conclude that there is “no imperative without an imperator.”100 Kelsen 
had in effect pulled the rug from under traditional ideas of legal 
subsumption. However, the dynamism he introduced into legal practice 
seems to have stopped short of extending its considerations to the 
underlying rule that is being applied. While on his account judicial 
decisions do create norms in concrete cases, decisions appear to leave 
the general and abstract underlying provisions on which they are based 
untouched. 
Other scholars have since gone further, but have encountered other 
limitations. The architects of the New Haven School were, for example, 
most outspoken about their disdain for thinking in terms of formal 
sources. Myres McDougal found that international law should be 
“regarded not as mere rules but as a whole process of authoritative 
 
 96. Id. at 4. 
 97. Cf. NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT 256 (1993) (“Alles schriftlich 
fixierte Recht ist mithin zu interpretierendes Recht. . . . Jeder aktuell geltende Text setzt sich der 
Interpretation aus, ja ist Text nur im Kontext von Interpretation.”); Dworkin, supra note 82, at 
179–200 (reaching the same conclusion from a different theoretical angle). 
 98. HANS KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE 95 (1934). On this point Kelsen draws heavily on 
Adolf Merkl, Das doppelte Rechtsantlitz, 47 JURISTISCHE BLÄTTER 425 (1918). 
 99. Id. at 95. 
 100. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF NORMS 29 (Michael Hartley trans. 1991). 
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decisions in the world arena.”101 Michael Reisman argued in his article, 
International Lawmaking:  A Process of Communication, that scholarly 
teachings and judgments had developed a myth—the myth that 
international law could be found by looking at what Article 38 of the 
ICJ Statute claims to be the sources of all law.102 He maintains that 
international law rather emerges from the myriad of legal 
communications that a plethora of actors utter every day.103 The main 
problem with this theoretical strand is that it follows a purely 
instrumental understanding of international law that places legal 
interpretation in the service of given substantive goals. Legal practice 
has nothing distinct from politics.104  
More recent voices from New Haven have also developed the 
theory of transnational legal processes that suggests analyzing the 
dynamic and jurisgenerative interactions among a multitude of actors 
rather than the formal sources of the law.105 However, this theory 
remains oddly torn between an endeavor to explain compliance with a 
given norm through transnational legal processes, on the one hand, and 
the development of norms, on the other.106 The emphasis is, after all, on 
the former element while the latter remains oblique.107  
A quite similar picture of lawmaking in communicative processes 
emerges in the theoretical framework of systems theory. Systems theory 
pictures law as a system within society constituted by communications 
that operate with reference to the binary code of legal versus illegal.108 
Interestingly, understanding law as a system of legal communications 
replaces answers to the question of legal validity that look at a norm’s 
 
 101. MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 169, 170 (1960). See also 
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 106. Hongju Harold Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 626–27 
(1998). 
 107. Id. at 653–55. 
 108. LUHMANN, supra note 97, at 61. 
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formal pedigree with the test of practice. Only communicative 
operations can tell what the law is.109 Views from New Haven neglect 
the intrinsic logic of legal practice by subjecting interpretation in law to 
the logics of the political, economic, or cultural system. Conversely, 
systems theory recognizes legal practice as a distinct enterprise, but 
loses any adequate grasp on the actual interpretative acts performed by 
living human beings. 
The concept of practice can transcend this divide. While practice 
has long been predominantly coined in strong structuralist (and mainly 
Marxist) traditions, it has come to be increasingly used in a way that 
includes elements of agency. Maurice Merleau-Ponty has brought life 
into the concept of practice, describing practice as historically-situated 
speaking, thinking, and acting.110 Pierre Bourdieu also picked up the 
concept and developed his sociology with the notion of a praxeological 
epistemology, seeking to overcome the divide between approaches 
centered on structures and those focused on actors.111 In the 
jurisgenerative practice of interpretation, international courts are alive 
as actors, not unbound, but constrained in their behavior. 
B.  Objectivism, Subjectivism, and the Normative Force of Practice 
The suggestion that international courts make law in the practice of 
adjudication challenges the idea of the rule of law and questions the 
concept of law even more fundamentally. In H.L.A. Hart’s words, 
“[l]egal theory has in this matter a curious history; for it is apt either to 
ignore or to exaggerate the indeterminacies of legal rules.”112 In order to 
avoid yet another twist to this curious history, the concept of practice 
mediates between unconstrained agency and determinative structures 
that leave no room for the choice of actors.113 But how does it do so? 
Hart writes that it is necessary to distinguish a core of settled meanings 
from disputed meanings,114 which may offer stability. It seems, 
 
 109. Id. at 110 (“Der einzige Geltungstest liegt deshalb im Gelingen einer laufenden 
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however, that stable meaning is the result of the absence of dispute. 
While there is at times some plausibility to the recurrent argument that 
there is no dispute because the norm is clear, the line of reasoning 
should more often than not be turned into its exact opposite. Most of the 
time norms are clear because there is no dispute. When it comes to 
international adjudication, the norm is at least unclear enough that each 
side can make an arguable claim for its position.  
Judicial decisions then involve a choice between at least two 
alternatives. The concept of decision itself already defies the idea that a 
clear norm could be found.115 The suggestion that words do not have a 
meaning other than that contributed to them by their use further adds to 
the challenge. How is it possible to understand the practice of 
adjudication as an activity that oscillates between the snares of 
objectivism (the plain meaning of the text) and pure subjectivism 
(subjecting the text to the pure volition of the reader)? In other words, 
how is it possible that the law can constrain the interpreter if only the 
practice of interpretation makes the law? 
First of all, interpretation in law is limited by the fact that it needs 
to be accepted as a legal interpretative claim. Rules of interpretation and 
standards upheld by the legal profession prescribe how participants in 
legal discourse have to craft their arguments.116 Interpretation in law is a 
distinct enterprise whose particularity is upheld by a combination of 
moral choice, beliefs, ethos, and habit. It has also been suggested that 
interpreters need to convey their argument as based on the law as it 
stands if they want to succeed in a way that is marked precisely by the 
rules of interpretation.117 Ultimately, however, the rules of interpretation 
are themselves nothing but rules and subject to the same fate of 
interpretation. This first attempt thus begs the question of how the 
practice of interpretation can be constrained by rules that are only the 
produce of that same practice. 
 
 115. See Jacques Derrida, Force of Law:  The Mystical Foundation of Authority, 11 
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The more promising answer to this question can be found by 
considering that interpretations need to be accepted by interlocutors 
within an interpretative community.118 Assessments of whether a 
decision of an international court was correct can only be part of the 
practice of interpretation itself. In order to succeed, an interpretation of 
a rule needs to connect to the past in a way that shapes future 
applications.119 To illustrate this point, Robert Brandom, spear-heading 
the discussion of these questions in the philosophy of language, resorts 
to a case law model of communication in which “[t]he current judge is 
held accountable to the tradition she inherits by the judges yet to 
come.”120 Present international courts are constrained by considerations 
of how their interpretations will be received. Notably, this constraint 
will depend on how the courts connect to the past.121 In this sense, the 
role of international courts in the development of the law is interstitial; 
it stands between the past and the future.122 The law gains shape and 
develops in this interpretation in which actors demand and give reasons 
for or against a particular interpretation of a provision. Practice itself 
generates and upholds the law—it contains the yardstick of what should 
legally be and how a provision should be interpreted.  
Brandom further draws attention to the fact that the authority of 
speakers matters in this practice.123 An interpreter who has interpreted 
correctly in the past has a certain credit.124 Further considerations of 
social legitimacy may also come into play. Notably then, international 
courts are recognized in the international legal system, almost by 
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default, as ultimate arbiters of what the law really means.125 What 
matters in the development of international law by way of interpretation 
is the semantic authority of particular actors, above all international 
courts.126 The notion of semantic authority refers to an actor’s capacity 
to influence and shape meanings, as well as the ability to establish their 
communications as authoritative reference points in legal discourse. In 
fact, the interpretations of international courts usually carry weight in 
the communicative practice of international law and therefore have also 
significant potential to bear heavily on its development. 
IV.  THE SEMANTIC AUTHORITY OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
Part IV.A elucidates the spell of precedents in judicial practice as 
one of the main factors sustaining international courts’ semantic 
authority, transcending any distinction between their roles as developers 
or interpreters of the law. Part IV.B then turns to the normative 
implications that follow from international courts’ authority in the 
making of the law. 
A.  The Spell of Precedents 
International courts enjoy an outstanding position in semantic 
struggles about the meaning of law.127 With concrete case decisions and 
reasoning that supports their findings, international courts exercise a 
great deal of authority over the legal discourse. Quite a few judgments 
even appear to be geared towards providing authoritative reference 
points for future discourse, making general and abstract formulations 
that may not even be compelled by the case.128 A combination of 
sociological predispositions, as well as the law itself, sustains courts’ 
semantic authority. In case of dispute, the law points to them for 
resolution. In Bourdieu’s words,  
 
 125. Such recognition is nothing natural or necessary and it may indeed shift. The histories of 
many legal systems show this. 
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L.J. 1083 (2011) (discussing authority exercised by investment treaty tribunals); see Ingo Venzke, 
Making General Exceptions:  The Spell of Precedents in Developing Article XX GATT into 
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[t]he judgment represents the quintessential form of authorized, 
public, official speech . . . magical acts which succeed because they 
have the power to make themselves universally recognized. They 
thus succeed in creating a situation in which no one can refuse or 
ignore the point of view, the vision, which they impose.129  
If one considers the mighty spell of precedents in the practice of 
international law, then success of international decisions appears less 
magical but more in line with participants’ normative expectations.130 
International courts enjoy semantic authority above all because of the 
working of precedents. 
International legal doctrine strikes a different tone. It is trite and 
commonplace that international law knows no stare decisis rule, that 
judgments are binding only inter partes,131 and that Article 38(1)(d) of 
the ICJ Statute mentions judicial decisions only as subsidiary means of 
interpretation, as a Rechtserkenntnisquelle (source for recognizing the 
law) and not a Rechtsquelle (a source of law).132 While it is not bare of 
all merit, this distinction in doctrine does overshadow the actual 
working of precedents. Judges frequently relate their argument to earlier 
decisions, thus boosting the authority of past, present, and future 
decisions. This practice responds to international courts’ aspiration to 
portray their practice as objective and rule-bound and it responds to all 
actors’ expectations. Notably, such expectations persist regardless of 
whether participants have stronger civil- or common-law backgrounds. 
In many judgments, precedent amounts to influential arguments, 
and actors in legal interpretation fight about the meaning of previous 
decisions just like they do about the meaning of instruments that come 
under the heading of sources. In most practical circumstances, 
interpreters cannot escape the discussion of case law. Judicial decisions 
significantly redistribute argumentative burdens and courts are expected 
to decide consistently or, if they deviate from precious jurisprudence, to 
give reasons why they do so.133 There is both a force as a matter of fact, 
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as well as an attitude that interpretation should relate to relevant earlier 
decisions. 
For a long time, courts have continuously stressed the significance 
of precedents and have contributed to their power. In its Mavrommatis 
case, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) found that it 
had “no reason to depart from a construction which clearly flows from 
the previous judgments the reasoning of which it still regards as 
sound.”134 In his thorough analysis of the PCIJ, Ole Spiermann shows 
that the court portrayed an increasing inclination to actively engage in 
international lawmaking, and that the working of precedent was crucial 
in this endeavor.135 In 1958, Hersch Lauterpacht also found that “the 
practice of referring to its previous decisions has become one of the 
most conspicuous features of the Judgments and Opinions of the 
Court.”136 Certainly, the use and influence of precedents is not a new 
phenomenon, but it has lately gained increasing magnitude, together 
with the establishment of new institutions and increasing frequency of 
international adjudication.137 
Adjudication in the WTO context offers persuasive examples. In 
one of its first cases, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the AB relied on 
Article 3.2 of the DSU, which provides that “[t]he dispute settlement of 
the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to 
the multilateral trading system,” to argue that its reports “create 
legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should 
be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute.”138 In a 
renewed appeal on the issue of zeroing, a measure to calculate anti-
dumping duties, the AB recalled that WTO Members have repeatedly 
stressed “the importance of consistency and stability” in 
interpretation.139 The AB then continued to emphasize that its findings 
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are clarifications of the law and, as such, are not limited to the specific 
case.140 Finally, it attacked the Anti-Dumping Panel for failing to follow 
its earlier reports, stating:  “We are deeply concerned about the Panel’s 
decision to depart from well-established Appellate Body jurisprudence 
clarifying the interpretation of the same legal issues. The Panel’s 
approach has serious implications for the proper functioning of the 
WTO dispute settlement system . . .”.141 
The European Communities had joined the proceedings as a third 
party and attempted to push the argument even further, suggesting that 
the Panel would fail to conduct an “objective assessment” of the matter 
before it, in connection with its claim under Article 11 of the DSU, if it 
did not follow the AB’s precedent.142 Although the AB itself did not go 
that far, it created a lingering threat by suggesting that disregard for its 
precedent might actually amount to a failure of exercising a proper 
judicial function.143 
The weight that the AB explicitly attaches to its previous reports 
almost makes a mockery out of the view that reports have no legal 
effects beyond the parties to the dispute. Relevant actors have come to 
recognize the systemic impact of adjudication onto trade law in general. 
In the discussion of one of the first AB reports in the DSB, the Brazilian 
representative stated: 
It was well-known that in practice any decision of a panel or the 
Appellate Body with regard to a specific case would go beyond such 
a specific case. Although no binding precedents had been created, 
the findings and conclusions of panels and the Appellate Body 
adopted by the DSB had created expectations concerning future 
interpretations of the DSU and the WTO Agreement. Therefore, in 
light of these systemic implications of decisions and 
recommendations pertaining to a specific case, Brazil wished to state 
its position with regard to certain findings of the Appellate Body.144 
The powerful working of precedent fuelling international courts’ 
semantic authority in legal discourse is particularly strong in the WTO, 
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not least due to the dynamics associated with a system of appellate 
review.145 However, this authority is not a phenomenon of such a 
context alone. The field of international investment arbitration could 
comparatively be a hard case because of its decentralized and slightly 
disparate institutional and legal structure. It is true that investment 
tribunals have largely played it safe, suggesting that they can find 
“inspiration” in earlier decisions of other courts and tribunals.146 Yet the 
authority of precedent is remarkable when it is used as shorthand for 
what the law is. References to earlier decisions have in fact been used as 
substitutes for a tribunal’s own reasoning.147 It is also noteworthy that 
the tribunal in Saipem v. Bangladesh recognized that it might not only 
seek inspiration from earlier decisions as it pleases, but that it must pay 
due consideration to earlier decisions of international tribunals.148 The 
tribunal believed that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it had a 
duty to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent cases.149 It 
also believed that, subject to the specifics of a given treaty and of the 
circumstances of the actual case, it had a duty to seek to contribute to 
the harmonious development of investment law, and thereby to meet the 
legitimate expectations of the community of States and investors 
towards certainty of the rule of law.150  
This seems all the more true and pertinent when, as the Tribunal in 
El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic put 
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it, “parties, in their written pleadings and oral arguments, have heavily 
relied on precedent.”151 Parties’ pleadings are usually not accessible, but 
it can safely be assumed that counsels usually unfold their argument 
with supporting precedent. 
In the practice of adjudication, international courts exercise 
semantic authority and thereby contribute to the making of international 
law. One of the main mechanisms that fosters their position in the 
international legal discourse is the working of precedent that 
redistributes argumentative burdens, shapes the normative expectations 
of all actors involved, and thus serves as a vehicle that drives 
international courts’ role as interpreters and developers of the law, or, 
more clearly, as lawmakers. This understanding of their practice then 
places the emphasis on international courts’ exercise of authority and 
ultimately challenges prevailing narratives of legitimation. Which 
normative implications follow from international courts semantic 
authority? 
B.  Normative Implications 
The semantic authority that international courts exercise in the 
practice of adjudication challenges the narrative of legitimacy that is 
embedded in the traditional view, which sees international decisions as 
flowing from the consent of the subjects they address. International 
courts tend to keep with this script even at great stretch.152 When this 
stretch becomes all too difficult, functional considerations frequently 
step in to help and to complement the justificatory basis of consent.153 
Viewed from this angle, international decisions are justified by way of 
functional accounts in the sense that adjudication is taken to promote 
values, goals or community interests, and above all, international 
peace.154 The institutional design of some international judicial 
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institutions does, at least in part, support this view.155 The international 
criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court are, for example, 
supposed to also gain legitimacy by way of ending impunity for 
international crimes.156 Such functional narratives appear to be a little 
weaker with regard to the WTO and arbitration in investment disputes, 
but it is also possible to find legitimation in these fields by means of the 
goals of increased economic welfare or economic development.157 
There are a number of situations in which these sources of 
legitimacy might carry the justification of an international court’s 
authority quite far. But in light of the growing autonomy of some 
courts, as well as in view of the breadth of controversial fields in which 
international courts are involved, there are now also many constellations 
in which neither the original consent nor the functional goal can any 
longer convincingly settle legitimatory concerns. International courts’ 
function of successfully settling disputes in the service of peace 
certainly remains most relevant, not least for the promotion of 
democratic governance, which, after all, flourishes better in a peaceful 
world.158 
And yet, like other justifications that hinge on the goals to be 
pursued, this theory misses large chunks of the scope of international 
judicial practice and ignores other principled considerations that speak 
against placing too much weight on functional legitimacy. “[A]s 
important as a certain goal may be, it cannot fully settle the justification 
of public authority. The aim cannot offer sufficient basis for concrete 
decisions that inevitably entail critical normative questions and 
redistributions of power. Moreover, functional arguments offer no 
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solution for the unavoidable competition between different goals.”159 It 
may sometimes be true that international adjudication achieves what 
everyone wants and yet fails to deliver.160 Yet even those may be lucky 
hits. History cautions that too much confidence should not be placed 
even on the benevolent and enlightened ruler, not even if they are 
judges.  
Considerations of democratic legitimation remain the gold 
standard against which any kind of public authority ultimately needs to 
be assessed, including international public authority.161 Under this basic 
premise it is possible to sketch a number of strategies that may help 
justify the authority international courts exercise by way of their legal 
interpretations. Such strategies first of all include elements of the 
procedural law of international judicial institutions, particularly rules 
pertaining to transparency, third-party participation, and the openness 
towards amici curiae.162 Reconsidering mechanisms in the election of 
judges may also help. Developments geared towards improving the 
politico-legislative process, both within the particular regimes in which 
international courts are embedded, as well as within the international 
legal order more generally, may further respond to legitimatory 
concerns that spring from the authority that international courts exercise 
in the practice of adjudication. Such strategies harbor a legitimating 
potential that is slowly set free, even if their concrete effects need to be 
tested on an empirical basis and in view of a number of possible 
downsides and alternatives. Notably, quite a few suggestions are met 
halfway by recent trends in practice, driven above all by courts 
themselves. Trends towards greater transparency and improved avenues 
for participation, for example, are indicative of a deeper change in the 
thinking about judicial interpretation, which increasingly recognize and 
come to terms with the role of international courts in lawmaking. 
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V.  PROGNOSIS 
Working out the jurisgenerative practice of adjudication in 
international law and drawing attention to the role international courts 
play in semantic struggles about what the law means challenge orthodox 
narratives about the legitimation of their practice. There is much room 
for exploring the precise parameters of legitimation and the different 
strategies that may respond to this challenge. As part thereof, and going 
beyond such efforts, there are two concrete tasks that may be 
particularly salient. The first would be a plain sociological endeavor. If 
international courts are indeed significant actors who exercise public 
authority, then it would simply be helpful to know more about those 
actors, both as institutions and in their personal composition. Both 
professional as well as cultural preferences—elements that sustain a 
vision of the world and of (international) law more generally—are very 
powerful factors in processes of communicative lawmaking. Who are 
the rulers? While such studies are far advanced in many domestic legal 
systems, the international judge has more successfully escaped closer 
scrutiny, even if international legal scholarship is catching up.163 
The second task would be more straightforwardly normative. It 
relates to political theory as well as an assignment for legal doctrine. 
Responses to problems regarding the justification of international 
courts’ authority will ultimately have to extend to considerations 
regarding the allocation of authority in a multilevel system of 
governance.164 In this context, it happens that actors on competing levels 
of governance can offer good reasons, also under basic premises of 
democratic legitimation, for why their claims to legality should prevail. 
The AB may, for example, give voice to an international bargain and 
find that the European import prohibition of hormone-treated beef is 
illegal under trade law. The European polity may still find that it really 
does not like hormone-treated beef and continue to live in breach of its 
international obligations while respecting the wishes of European 
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(domestic or international) part of it”). 
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citizens. There is competition between levels of governance and 
between legal orders. No single actor has the ultimate say on how to 
treat the issue.165 Also, in terms of political theory, it is difficult if not 
impossible to find sufficient hold in order to settle the issue.166 It would 
thus be well advised and critical to further develop ideas about 
legitimate public authority in a system of multilevel governance in 
which actors accommodate and contest international courts’ practice 
and where international courts stay attuned to competing spheres of 
authority. While international and domestic courts will be the main 
actors governing the borders between levels of governance, legal 
doctrine could help in shaping the vocabulary for their interaction. A 
critical place of work would be a refined understanding of standards of 
review that reflects their functioning on the lines of legal orders, 
allocating authority in a normative pluriverse. 
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